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Abbreviations and Definitions 
 
Basel Committee  The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision 
Combined Ratio  For non-life insurers, this is the sum of the loss ratio and 
the expense ratio. 
EC European  Commission 
EU European  Union 
Expense Ratio  The ratio of expenses to earned premium, usually 
expressed as a percentage. 
FSAP  Financial Sector Assessment Program 
FSF  Financial Stability Forum 
IAA  International Actuarial Association 
IAIS International  Association of Insurance Supervisors 
IASB International  Accounting Standards Board 
IFRS  International Financial Reporting Standard 
Loss Ratio  The ratio of incurred claims to earned premium, usually 
expressed as a percentage. 
Non-life insurance  Used in this paper although some readers may be more 
familiar with the term “general insurance” or “property 
and casualty insurance”. 
Solvency  In this paper, solvency should be read as referring to the 
ongoing ability of an insurance company to meet its 
obligations as and when they fall due, and not being 
limited to consideration on a going concern basis. 
Solvency 
Assessment 




A regulatory requirement regarding the minimum surplus 
of assets over liabilities, however these items may be 
defined in the solvency regime. 
Technical Provisions  Insurance company balance sheets hold, represented as 
liabilities, provisions for the payment of claims and other 
insurance related obligations. In general terms, these 
provisions represent monies to cover known claims that 
have occurred, been reported to the company, but not 
yet settled in full, claims that have occurred but have not 
been reported to the company as yet, the possible 
adverse development of claims that are yet to be finally 
settled and paid, and future obligations for events after 
the balance date that are covered by current contracts. 
Allowance would also be included for expected costs of 
the management and settlement of such claims. All of 
these components can be described as the “technical 
provisions”. 
WTO  World Trade Organization 
   3
1 Introduction
2 
Solvency, its adequacy, regulation and supervision, is at the heart of the 
operation of the insurance sector and underpins the prospect for insurers to 
contribute effectively to the financial sector and the economy.  
 
The first aim of insurance supervision is the protection of the interests of the 
policyholders through a properly managed and financially sound insurance 
sector. The establishment of effective rules for the proper valuation of insurance 
liabilities and the establishment of provisions to support those liabilities is 
fundamental as is a system that requires a margin over and above provisions so 
as to enable a firm to absorb unexpected adversity. As a result, the most tangible 
step that can be taken by authorities toward improvement of insurance 
supervision is the regulation and supervision of solvency. 
 
Regrettably, it is all too often the case that a jurisdiction’s solvency regime is 
identified as being in need of attention.  However the solution to a deficient 
regime is not as clear as in other sectors as there is no standard international 
approach. Commonly, countries have looked to an index-based system such as 
the currently operating EU system or a form of “risk-based capital” from North 
American systems or some point between these two. The EU model is less 
complex to apply than the RBC formula but does not give a great deal of 
quantitative attention to asset related risks in the solvency margin requirement 
itself, instead relying on qualitative asset rules at least for those assets backing 
the technical provisions of the insurance company, and possibly a guarantee 
fund. 
 
The recent operating environment for insurers around the world has been harsh. 
Non-life insurers in most major markets suffered continued falling prices through 
the 1990s, high claims levels, and consequent poor underwriting profitability. Life 
Insurers in many jurisdictions have been adversely affected by falling asset 
values and difficulties in meeting the cost of investment return guarantees. 
Pressure on capital levels has been reflected in credit rating downgrades and 
falling values of company stock. Companies are consolidating business 
operations to focus on core operations or to realize value. Although rate 
increases in the non-life sector have improved expectations, anecdotal evidence 
suggests that the current cycle may be peaking well before the point at which  
stakeholders hoped for to ensure adequate profitability over the full cycle. 
 
The insurance sector in most countries is undergoing development, or the 
expectation of change is clear. Drivers of change are economic growth,  
liberalizing markets, international harmonization, and change within firms in 
response to adverse developments. 
                                                 
2 The paper was developed after a series of interviews and documentary review and analysis. Interviews 
were conducted with ratings agencies, industry observers, and the leaders of the relevant international 
projects. This paper was prepared in July 2003. Information in the paper is current as at that date.   4
 
In the absence of an agreed approach to insurance solvency, several 
international bodies are developing projects that will have far-reaching 
consequences for insurance markets. This paper includes a review of a number 
of projects that influence solvency measurement and solvency assessment of 
insurance entities and are key to moving toward the development of international 
standards. A summary of the projects of the European Union, the International 
Accounting Standards Board, the International Association of Insurance 
Supervisors and the International Actuarial Association has been included. In 
large part, although each with their own particular focus, these projects are 
moving toward a consistent end position. That position will be radically different 
to the current practice in many countries and will present particular challenges for 
implementation and transition. 
 
In many emerging markets, the implementation of these international standards 
is likely to be made more difficult as a result of limited capacity and an absence 
of necessary infrastructure. At the same time, liberalization of markets is 
progressing as countries seek WTO accession. Changes usually increase the 
complexity of the task facing both company management and supervisors.  The 
combined effects of a rapidly liberalizing market, challenging change and limited 
capacity can only be addressed through proactive steps to anticipate challenges 
and a phased approach to implementation. The proposed sequencing is set out 
in the final section of this paper. 
 
The objective of this paper is to: 
 
•  prepare a summary of the issues 
 
•  develop a view on the key challenges arising 
 
•  consider the potential responses to these challenges in the context of our 
client countries and their insurance markets. 
 
The paper is organized to first provide an overview of some of the influences on 
the insurance markets at the time of writing. Section 3 provides a short 
commentary on each project. Section 4 sets out common themes and 
observations arising, and section 5 proposes a response. The conclusions of the 
paper are summarized in section 6. 
 
2 Difficult  Times 
At the time of writing, the insurance sector is enduring a difficult operating 
climate. 
 
Historically, underwriting and investment results have been considered to be 
negatively correlated by many market participants. Periods of strong investment   5
performance attract increased capital and generate increased capacity that leads 
to increased competition and softening market prices with a deterioration in 
underwriting results. In contrast to this conventional wisdom, recent performance 
has seen significantly deteriorating investment market performance coincident 
with poor underwriting performance. In some cases, the “conventional wisdom” 
had been taken as immutable law by management, to its subsequent peril. 
 
For insurers and reinsurers, significant claims arising from natural and man-made 
catastrophes have flowed through to higher claim provisions, lower profitability 
and reduced capital strength. 
 
Catastrophes have not been the only reason for poor underwriting results. 
Markets have tended to show marked pricing cycles. A recent period of 
increased prices has followed a long period where prices were considered to be 
at levels that were unsustainable. Other insurance classes, such as medical 
indemnity or workers compensation business have seen prolonged periods of 
inadequate prices in some jurisdictions that erode profitability. There is evidence 
emerging that the general turnaround in prices, welcome for insurers and 
shareholders, may have reached a peak sooner than many were hoping – or 
indeed sooner than they were relying upon to secure the desired returns on 
equity. 
 
Major investment markets have seen prolonged falls in interest rates on fixed 
interest securities and a more recent but dramatic fall in equity prices. Where 
companies provided products to customers with a guaranteed rate of return over 
a long term, then the inability to meet this rate implies a negative interest margin 
– in some cases substantial relative to their balance sheet as a whole – and 
continuing drains on profitability. 
 
Against this background, official concerns have been elevated and a number of 
initiatives have been pursued to monitor the insurance sector more closely. 
Companies have also responded by increasing capital, reducing risk, or 
consolidating operations and exiting non-core market activities. 
 
This section provides summary information on the operating environment facing 
the insurance sector with respect to these issues. 
2.1 Catastrophic  Risk 
Catastrophic events highlight the role of the insurance sector to those outside its 
normally mysterious world. Significant insurance exposures to catastrophic 
events in 2001, and the claims that arose both directly and indirectly, provided 
companies with the catalyst to increase charges and reduce the scope of 
coverage offered. 
 
The events of September 2001 did not, however, make that year the largest total 
catastrophic loss year in recent record. The 1992 events associated, in particular,   6
with Hurricane Andrew in the USA were greater in cost in current dollar terms 
(see Figure 1). 
 











































Source: Swiss Re Sigma 2/2003. 
 
Insurance companies are influenced by catastrophes through the combination of 
the frequency of occurrence of the events themselves and the level of the 
insurable exposure attached to such events.  
 
Recent experience has seen an increasing number of man-made catastrophes 
as economic activity expands and terrorism becomes an issue. There is also 
some evidence of an increase in the frequency of natural hazards. One 
explanation may be the increased reach of information systems (including 
increased insurance penetration). Another cause may be long-term climatic 
trends. 
 
Increasing costs from catastrophic events are also a function of increased 
insurance coverage. The primary costs of a catastrophe (ie property loss and   7
damage) are now more likely to be overtaken by secondary insurance effects 
such as covers for liability, negligence, or business interruption. 
2.2 Rate  Cycles 
Performance of non-life insurance business lines has been poor in many 
jurisdictions for reasons that go beyond catastrophic exposures. The sector has 
seen a prolonged “soft” market through the 1990s. Unfortunately, much of the 
industry commentary on market cycles is based on commercially sensitive 
information that is reported anecdotally and is not quantitative. Two indicative 
sources of information are set out below. 
 
Figure 2 shows premiums to GDP reported for non-life insurance for the total 
world market and for OECD and G7 country groupings. This indicator should 
broadly follow market pricing cycle trends as insurance coverage can be 
assumed to grow with economic activity and, for these aggregates, the index is 
less likely to be influenced by local factors such as increased utilization of 
insurance products or privatization in particular markets and product lines. Over 
the period, the insurance penetration has shown a trending decrease and some 
evidence of a cycle. 
 
Figure 2: Insurance Penetration (Premiums as a percentage of GDP) for Non-life Insurance 
 
 
Source: Swiss Re Sigma (various). 
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If we consider that it is unlikely that insurance coverage would have fallen in real 
terms over the period and that the value of goods and risks insured would have 
been maintained if not increased with GDP then, over the period shown in Figure 
2, prices have fallen by over 12% in real terms. Profit margins are expressed in 
terms of much smaller percentages of premium income so these pricing changes 
have had severe consequences for ongoing profitability. 
 
Lloyd’s publishes a rate of change in premiums per transaction that is a proxy for 
rate movements. Reported information from successive quarterly reports is 
provided in Table 1. Current information by some individual classes of business is 
shown in Figure 3. There are indications that the period of increasing rates is 
coming to an end, and that rates are falling in some classes. 
 
Table 1: Premium Rate Changes in the Lloyd's Market 
Period (months) Period end
Percentage increase 
(total compared to 
equivalent period in 
previous year)
Twelve Dec-02 16.8                            
Nine Sep-02 23.0                            
Six Jun-02 25.3                            
Three Mar-02 26.7                            
Twelve Dec-01 24.1                            
Nine Sep-01 28.5                            
Six Jun-01 32.0                            
Three Mar-01 42.5                            
Twelve Dec-00 n/a
Nine Sep-00 10.0                            
Six Jun-00 8.4                              
Three Mar-00 2.2                                
 
Source: Lloyd’s Quarterly Business Reports. 
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Figure 3: Change in Premium per Transaction – 2002 compared to equivalent period in 2001 
 
Source: Lloyds, Ins-sure and MR analysis. 
 
Other analyses based on surveys of underwriters have pointed to expectations 
for increased rates during periods of rate “hardening” and can provide a leading 
indicator in terms of the availability of statistics. However, the surveys tend to 
overstate the upturn in rates once actual renewal data are examined. Even now, 
expectations are moderating compared to that of a year ago suggesting the cycle 
is turning. “The latest market survey shows that underwriters across all the 
sectors are still expecting rates to rise overall but that the rises are harder to 
achieve in a fewer areas of business” 
3. 
 
For the sector, there is a clear view that prices need to increase further if 
profitability is to be restored to adequate levels 
4. The emerging evidence that the 
extent of price increases seen in the last two years may be the totality of the 
market “hardening” would be of concern to those who are relying on price 
increases alone to restore adequate profitability. 
                                                 
3 Lloyds Quarterly Business Report for Q4 2002 – p(i). 
4 In the US market, for example, the non-life industry combined ratio improved to 107.2% in 2002 from 
115.7% in 2001 but needs to fall to a level much closer to 100%, if not below it, for adequate profitability. 
(Source AM Best). With respect to the top 25 international reinsurance groups by premium income, their 
combined ratio for the year ending 2000 was 112.1 and their  profit stood at just 1.13% of shareholders 
funds (adjusted to a common accounting base) Source: Standard and Poors.   10
2.3  Asset Market Performance 
Just as the performance of non-life insurance company liabilities has been poor, 
asset markets in major jurisdictions have also imposed adversity on balance 
sheets of insurance companies. 
 
A fundamental investment of insurance companies has always been fixed 
interest securities, particularly those issued by governments. Over the last 
decade, yields on these contracts have fallen progressively (see Figure 4). Market 
limitations usually imply that life insurers are most likely to have liabilities of a 
longer duration than their assets - a permanent mismatched position. As a result, 
there is an adverse impact when rates fall as liability values increase at a greater 
rate than asset values. Even where book value accounting may preclude an 
immediate transparent view, there is a consequential problem frequently referred 
to in terms of reinvestment of assets as they mature at rates lower than that 
required to support the liabilities (the so-called “negative margin” problem). 
 
Figure 4: Bond Yields 1994 - 2003 
 
Source: European Central Bank. 
 
In response, where minimum rates of return were specified in regulations, moves 
to reduce the minimum rate for new business have been initiated
5. In the most 
extreme situations, reductions in rates for existing contracts have also been 
proposed by industry in a number of countries. 
 
Some jurisdictions saw companies respond to the pressure of negative interest 
margins through efforts to increase returns on assets by increasing exposure to 
                                                 
5 By way of example, reductions have taken place in EU countries and Switzerland and are under active 
consideration at the time of writing in Japan.   11
the equity markets. Since the end of 1999, however, equity returns in major 
markets have also been poor (see Table 2 and Figure 5). 
 
Table 2: Falls in Equity Markets (January 2000 to March 2002) 
Market Index  End March 2003 position relative to Jan 2000
Europe (Euro Stoxx Broad)  -52.9% 
USA (S&P 500)  -40.1% 
Japan (Nikkei 225)  -54.5% 
 
 
Figure 5: Stock Market Performance January 2000 to March 2003 
 
Source: European Central Bank, Staff Analysis. 
 
2.4  Heightened Official Concern 
In response to the adverse environment, supervisors and others at official level 
have taken a number of initiatives. These have ranged from closer monitoring of 
companies by individual supervisors to system-wide analyses within countries 
and at the international level
6. 
 
The IMF’s Global Financial Stability Reports have also highlighted continuing 
weakness in the insurance sector.  The March 2003 report states: “On balance, 
the financial condition of the insurance company sector has worsened, in some 
countries significantly. Insurance companies have been hard hit by the decline in 
equity and corporate bond markets … . In the early 1990s, many insurance 
                                                 
6 For example, see the coverage of insurance exposures in the half-yearly ‘Financial Stability Report’ of the 
Sveriges Riksbank p 37-40 of the 2002:2 edition. Also, chapter VII of the BIS 73
rd Annual Report.   12
companies locked into annuity products promising to pay fixed interest rates at 
the same time they were earning even higher returns on their asset portfolios 
with a high share of equities and corporate bonds in them. Since the bursting of 
the bubble, earnings on their asset portfolios have dropped below these fixed 
rates and in some cases turned negative. In the past three years, some 
insurance companies have also been substantial net sellers (protection 
providers) of credit default swaps, total return swaps, and equity put options. …  
Given the decline in equity and lower-quality bond markets, insurance companies 
participating in these markets might have to recognize further substantial losses 
in the near term.” (p22) 
 
“While financial institutions have been resilient despite severe asset price 
adjustments and corporate weakness, their remaining ability to absorb additional 
shocks may have been weakened.” (p16) 
 
The BIS annual report also expresses the continuing assessment of the 
insurance sector indicating, as part of their financial sector review, that 
“insurance companies showed more signs of stress, with portfolio losses 
imposing severe strains in some cases. Nonetheless, market-based measures of 
risk for both banks and insurance companies remained at low levels relative to 
those for non-financial firms, although default risk in the insurance sector rose 
last year.” (p121) 
 
The chorus of commentary and continued attention serves to highlight the 
importance of efforts to enhance supervision and to improve the transparency of 
the financial performance of the sector
7. 
 
In response to encouragement, the IAIS has moved to develop a standard on the 
supervision of reinsurance companies, particularly those that are internationally 
active, and established a Task Force to improve the transparency of the 
reinsurance sector. 
 
The IAIS adopted Principles on the Minimum Requirements for the 
Supervision of Reinsurers in 2002. This is a significant first step toward 
harmonizing supervisory practices for the global reinsurance industry. Under the 
principles, all reinsurers must be supervised, and it is expected that a global 
approach to supervision of reinsurers will be developed for consideration and 
adoption later in 2003. 
 
2.5  Capital, Ratings and Consolidation of Operations 
In response to this adversity, many companies have sought to raise additional 
capital. Between September 11, 2001 and the end of that year $US24.7 billion 
                                                 
7 For another succinct and current example, readers may wish to refer to the speech by Sir Andrew Large: 
Convergence in insurance and banking - some financial stability issues, London, 12 June 2003.   13
was raised by the industry to assist in rebuilding balance sheets and to establish 
new reinsurance companies and capacity.
8 
 
Losses have, however, generally exceeded the additional capital subscribed and 
the success of capital issues is far from guaranteed despite the perceived 
positive price outlook.
9 Ratings agencies have responded with successive 
downgrades. For example, 12 of the top 25 reinsurance groups carried negative 
ratings outlooks at the end of 2002 and, out of the top 150 reinsurance 
companies, there had been 47 downgrades through 2002 and just 3 upgrades
10 
(see Figure 6). 
 
Figure 6: Rating Migrations among the top 150 Reinsurance Companies* during 2002 
 
 
Source: Standard and Poors. 
 
Of particular relevance in all markets, not simply those that have been affected 
by local falls in asset markets or catastrophic exposures, has been the influence 
of the response of major firms. Insurance groups have commenced an active 
program of corporate restructuring and, in some cases, market exit. Not 
surprisingly, a number of companies are focusing on their home markets and the 
                                                 
8 Source: Standard and Poors Reinsurance Outlook 2002. 
9 The Economist, April 23, 2003 – “Aon, an insurance broker, estimates that reinsurers have lost $200 
billion in capital since the terrorist attacks of September 11th 2001. Only about $30 billion in new capital 
has come in, much of it through new companies established in Bermuda. The value of their equity 
investments has shrivelled. And most of them have to deal with a legacy of sloppy underwriting when the 
market was soft.” 
10 Source: Standard and Poors Global Reinsurance Outlook 2003.   14
need to repatriate capital back to support the existing business rather than to 
invest in growth opportunities and new ventures
11.  
 
In such an environment, diligence on the part of supervisors supported by robust 
regulatory requirements directed at change of control and market exit is critical, 
as is the monitoring of the extent that shareholder support for local operations 
can be expected. Improved efforts in liaison between supervisors will be of value. 
 
In addition, although not all markets have seen exposure to the effect of long-
term guarantees in contracts, this is a recurring issue in many markets. Such 
guarantees can take many forms. Examples include the guarantee of a minimum 
interest rate for investment accrual, the guarantee of a particular level of ultimate 
benefit (with the implied rate of return associated with such a benefit), the 
guarantee to convert to an annuity at a defined point of time and at a defined 
rate, or the guarantee to renew the contract at defined prices or terms. The 
lesson of the current times is that such guarantees must be regarded with 
caution. 
 
Many emerging and transition insurance markets face the effects of these 
challenges either directly or indirectly. These effects can be magnified because 
of the relative size of the economy or the specific circumstances in the sector. 
For example, it is common for these markets to have one or more of the 
following: 
 
•  Relatively strong guarantees in product mixes. Where such guarantees 
are being given, sometimes as a direct result of regulatory requirements 
that may mandate product features or include procedural limitations that 
would impede products without such guarantees, the continuation of this 
course should be reviewed to provide the relevant policy objectives 
through alternative methods. 
 
•  A greater dependence on international reinsurance markets to support 
local companies. 
 
•  Even where local investment markets have been more favorable, the 
pressures on multinationals has led to exits from local markets. 
 
3  International Institutional Developments 
A number of international institutions are pursuing initiatives of unprecedented 
scope in their potential impact on the insurance sector and its operating 
conditions. 
 
                                                 
11 See , for example, Industry Outlook Reports from Moody’s Investors Service.   15
The importance of the EU solvency system review extends beyond those 
countries currently in the EU or considering accession. Many jurisdictions use a 
solvency system modeled on the current EU directives so will look to this project 
with interest. Further, the project seems likely to move solvency systems in major 
insurance markets closer together, so increasing the potential for consensus at 
the global level. 
 
The emergence of an international accounting standard for insurance contracts is 
also a ground-breaking initiative. For a considerable period of time, the absence 
of consistent, transparent and comparable accounting practices has been a 
subject for criticism of the insurance sector. Although the IASB has developed a 
two-stage approach, the first stage will require those countries that adopt IASB 
standards to revisit their solvency systems fundamentally, if only because of the 
changed measurement and recognition elements of the proposals. 
 
The IAA and the IAIS are both working on projects that will ultimately elaborate 
the approach to quantifying insurance risk and capital requirements. 
 
This section provides some background and reviews the developments and 
outlook for each of these projects. 
 
In addition, as it is also an influence on the regulatory and supervisory 
environment, comment is made on the effect of WTO accession agreements that 
are often being implemented at the same time as the solvency related issues will 
need to be addressed. 
 
3.1  Developments at the EU 
The European Union solvency standard has long been seen as positive, 
practical, and useful. The EU regime has been based three critical elements: 
 
•  The proper establishment of relatively conservative provisions for liabilities 
to policyholders (technical provisions). 
 
•  The backing of these technical provisions with appropriate (and 
conservatively valued) assets governed by investment allocation rules. 
 
•  A solvency margin requirement over and above these other rules that is 
determined on the basis of a fixed ratio approach. That is, the solvency 
margin requirement is a function of the greater of a minimum figure
12, a 
percentage of the premiums and a percentage of the claims provisions in 
the case of the  non-life companies, or a percentage of the technical 
provisions and the sum at risk (in the case of life companies). 
                                                 
12 The minimum figure in the directives is referred to as the “guarantee fund” although it is not strictly a 
policyholder protection scheme arrangement so should not be confused.   16
 
Within the EU, the effective operation of the system has also benefited from a 
history of relatively strong supervision. 
 
This system has proven easy and cost effective to apply and understand. It also 
has the advantage of being entirely based on insurance company accounting 
data and, as a result, is subject to the audit and actuarial processes and 
oversight. The simplicity and cost effectiveness have also meant that the system 
has been adopted by a large number of non-European countries. 
 
However, the view is emerging that the system is in need of revision. Concerns 
include the absence of a specific reflection of asset risks in the solvency margin 
requirement itself, particularly with respect to non-life insurance, the reliance on 
premiums and provisions even when the company may be under pricing or under 
provisioning (and the built-in incentive that may exist to do so), the lack of 
sensitivity to the risk profile of the company, the absence of qualitative 
considerations of the risk management process within the company, and the 
absence of a forward-looking construct. 
 
At the same time, the European insurance market has seen increasing 
competition, pressure on shareholder value, continued capital market integration, 
the emergence of significant financial conglomerates, new distribution channels, 
and the development of market techniques such as “Asset Liability 
Management”, “Alternative Risk Transfer” and the increased use of derivatives 
(Martinho 2003). The recent unfavorable investment climate (noted in section 2.3 
above) is also relevant to the review. 
 
The response has been to move toward a new solvency regime, first through an 
essentially tactical change (Solvency I) that has now been completed and, more 
recently through a more wide-ranging review intended to lead to Solvency II. The 
Solvency II work has developed a number of basic working premises and it  is 
expected that the regime will: 
 
•  be more risk-sensitive than the current system 
 
•  assess “overall solvency” of an insurance company including both 
quantitative and qualitative aspects such as requirements on and the 
assessment of management and internal risk controls 
 
•  be based on a three-pillar structure although somewhat adapted to the 
needs of insurance supervision. (The three-pillar concept is discussed 
further in 4.1 below) 
 
•  be based on more sophisticated risk measurement encouraging insurance 
companies to improve the measurement and management of their risks 
   17
•  introduce a two-level structure with both a strictly defined minimum and a 
higher control level that is oriented more toward economic capital 
requirements of insurance companies 
 
•  improve harmonization of qualitative and quantitative insurance 
supervisory methods within the EU and also, where possible, across 
different parts of the financial sector. 
 
At this stage, it is anticipated that a framework directive will be presented as a 
proposal in 2005. 
 
The proposals are significant in that they : 
 
•  address technical provisions in more detail, including the potential for 
quantitative benchmarks of the level of prudence attached to provisioning 
 
•  propose a two-tier intervention level regime 
 
•  seek to align capital requirements to economic capital
13, at least at the 
second (higher) tier (target capital) and, therefore, envisage the possibility 
of approved internal model based capital components for larger or more 
sophisticated firms and “standard models” for smaller or less sophisticated 
firms 
 
•  anticipate a more explicit requirement for asset risk 
 
•  extend asset rules to the whole balance sheet rather than just to those 
backing the technical provisions 
 
•  seek to facilitate greater supervisory harmonization and transparency of 
both supervisory authorities and market participants within the EU market. 
 
The regulatory structure is proposed to follow the “Lamfalussy model” – a similar 
approach taken with respect to securities regulation
14. Several levels of rule-
making from the highest level (primary laws) to various subordinate structures for 
more detailed rules and the issuance of guidance would be established. As a 
result, the system is also likely to have more ongoing activity in monitoring and 
refinement. 
 
                                                 
13 Alignment to “economic capital” implies that the capital a company would hold in the absence of legal 
requirements would reflect the relative effects of various risks. Whether legal capital requirements are 
similar or of a marked different order of magnitude, if their relativities by risk type are similar to economic 
capital then the incentives in the capital structures are also more aligned – a desirable outcome. 
14 For more information on the Lamfalussy approach and its proposed application to insurance supervision 
in the EU see “Considerations on the links between the Solvency II Project and the extension of the 
‘Lamfalussy’ approach to insurance regulation MARKT/2519/02” available on the EU web site.    18
It should be noted, in the context of countries that are implementing a regime 
drawing on the current European system, that the countries in Europe see their 
current system as a minimum requirement and tend to enhance the system in a 
number of ways within their jurisdiction. As a result, although these changes may 
represent a significant step for a country with the current directives as both their 
minimum and maximum position, they are less of a step for many of the existing 
EU jurisdictions. The proposals that the supervisory processes and requirements 
can be expected to be more consistent between member states in the future will 
mean that EU jurisdictions are more likely to see the eventual new directives and 
subordinate rules and guidance as a move from minimum requirements more 
toward agreed requirements. 
3.2 IASB  Developments 
There are three projects of particular interest at the IASB plus one “active 
research” topic. The three projects are 
 
•  Insurance contracts Phase I 
 
•  Insurance contracts Phase II 
 
•  Amendments to IAS 32 Financial Instruments: Disclosure and 
Presentation and IAS 39 Financial Instruments: Recognition and 
Measurement. 
 
The two insurance projects represent progress toward an international 
accounting standard for insurance contracts, the original project having been 
established in 1997 and separated into these two phases in May of 2002. One of 
the reasons for the two-phased approach reflects the very far-reaching nature of 
the proposals overall and the significant technical detail that needs to be worked 
though to achieve the successful completion of the project. In addition, there is a 
desire to achieve a deliverable within a sensible timeframe recognizing that many 
jurisdictions, including most developing and transition countries, have indicated 
that they would adopt IASB standards  (IFRS) at a particular point, and including 
a requirement that all listed European Union companies be required to adopt 
IFRS compliance by 2005. In fact, more than 90 countries will either require or 
permit the use of IFRSs over the next five years. 
 
The IASB has designated an “active research” topic, “Accounting by Small and 
Medium Entities and in Emerging or Transition Economies” that is also of 
interest. 
 
This section sets out some salient points with respect to each of these initiatives. 
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3.2.1  Insurance Contracts Phase I 
The first phase of the insurance contracts project represents an “interim step” 
and is focused on the obligations of some companies and jurisdictions in 2005. 
The current proposal is for an exposure draft to be released in the third quarter of 
2003 and then an IFRS in 2004. 
 
The scope for the first phase is to: 
 
•  Define what is and what is not an “insurance contract” (Figure 7) 
 
•  Define what is not in the scope of phase I, on the basis that it is covered 
by existing IFRSs 
 
•  Consider a range of “temporary exemptions” from existing standards so 
that insurers may be permitted to continue current practices 
 
•  Make a number of improvements to existing practices 
 
•  Elaborate on the application of IAS 39 Financial Instruments: Recognition 
and Measurement to insurance and investment contracts issued by 
insurers 
 
•  Consider issues of presentation and disclosure. 
 
Despite being a more limited and “interim” project, the elements of this project 
will have implications for insurers and supervisors. 
 
In many cases, insurance accounting will have been constructed on an 
“insurance entity” rather than an “insurance contract” basis. The change to 
account for insurance contracts is deliberate. The implication is that other 
activities of insurance entities should be accounted for in the same manner as for 
any other entity. In this case, the accounting for other financial instruments 
becomes particularly important (see section 3.2.3 below). 
 
Similarly, the definition of “insurance contract” is important as it will define some 
activities within the scope of the project and consign others to the accounting 
approaches under other more general standards. The current definition is as 
follows (see Figure 7) and is proposed to be adopted throughout all IFRSs so as 
to ensure consistency. 
 
In particular, some standards have exclusions for “insurance entities” that will be 
replaced with exclusions for “insurance contracts”. Important examples are the 
scope exclusions contained in IAS 18 Revenue, IAS 32 Financial Instruments: 
Disclosure and Presentation, IAS 37 Provisions, Contingent Liabilities and 
Contingent Assets, IAS 38 Intangible Assets and IAS 39 Financial Instruments:   20
Recognition and Measurement. The effect is that “insurance entities” will have to 
follow these broader standards except for the accounting for the “insurance 
contracts”. Where an insurer issues insurance policies that do not meet the 
definition then they would be treated as investment contracts and accounted for 
under a deposit type approach. 
 
Figure 7: A Definition of an Insurance Contract 
 
An insurance contract is “a contract under which one party (the insurer) accepts 
significant risk by agreeing with another party (the policyholder) to compensate 
the policyholder of other beneficiary if a specified uncertain future event (the 
insured event) adversely affects the policyholder of other beneficiary.” 
 
Source: IASB Project Summary.
 
The tentative position of the IASB on matters relating to recognition and 
measurement of assets and liabilities, improvements to existing practices, and 
disclosure will lead to change in many jurisdictions to a greater or lesser extent 
as the IFRSs are adopted. 
 
For example,  
 
•  While current practices for recognition and measurement can continue 
under phase I, it will not be possible for an insurer to adopt a new 
accounting practice that perpetuates practices that are unlikely to survive 
into phase II. To this end, moving from a discounted to an undiscounted 
approach to liability valuation, creating or increasing margins in valuations 
of insurance liabilities that represent an effort toward “deliberate 
overstatement”, implicitly valuing future asset based fees at an amount 
above their “fair value”, or permitting subsidiaries to use non-uniform 
accounting methods should not be adopted as a new practice. 
 
•  Catastrophe provisions of a more general nature (not related to the risk of 
a particular closed book of business) and equalization provisions should 
not be permitted. 
 
•  Offsetting reinsurance assets against insurance liabilities should be 
prohibited – that is, the use of net provisioning should not be adopted. 
 
•  Loss-making contracts, when evaluated on the basis of current estimates 
of future cash flows, should have that loss recognized immediately.  
 
•  Liability valuations should recognize the liability under a contract at all 
times, until that liability has expired. 
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•  Where a contract has both a deposit component and an insurance 
component then these should be separated (“unbundled”) and treated 
accordingly. The deposit component would then be treated as a balance 
sheet movement and not as premium income. This is expected to apply to 
such contracts as financial reinsurance contracts and unbundled or 
universal life insurance policies. Traditional life insurance policies are not 
intended to be unbundled in this way. 
 
•  With respect to embedded derivatives and guarantees in products, more 
often found in life insurance contracts, phase I will not require these to be 
separately valued but, as a compromise, is proposing their “prominent 
disclosure” first descriptively and then quantitatively. 
 
•  Disclosure of significant assumptions, changes in assumptions and the 
sources of uncertainty is proposed along with disclosures on the 
objectives of risk management activities and the policies for mitigating 
these risks, extensive disclosure of insurance risk related information. 
 
•  Disclosure of fair values of insurance contracts, not yet fully defined by the 
IASB, will be required from 31 December 2006. From 2005, disclosure 
should be made about the “principal characteristics of the underlying 
assets and liabilities that are pertinent to their fair value”. 
 
The combined effects of these principles, in many jurisdictions, quite apart from 
the implementation challenges, is to recast the balance sheets of firms, increase 
the extent that information will need to be prepared even if it is disclosed in notes 
rather than the accounts themselves, require solvency margin requirements to be 
redefined reflecting the different level of security included in liability and asset 
values and the revised treatment of such items as premium income, or impose 
two separate reporting regimes on firms.  
 
Actual solvency may be affected depending, amongst other things, on the 
interaction between the new regime and the previous regime, the reaction of 
stakeholders to the new presented results, and the interaction with the taxation 
basis in force in the jurisdiction. Finally, firms are concerned about the effect that 
the regime would have on investors’ views of insurance stocks and, therefore, 
the ability to raise capital and the cost of that capital. 
 
3.2.2  Insurance Contracts Phase II 
The second phase of the insurance contracts project is progressing in the 
background while phase I is completed. A Draft Statement of Principles was 
prepared before the project was split into the two phases but has not been 
officially issued for comment although it is publicly available. After deliberation by   22
the IASB, it is envisaged that they will progress this project through the next 
phases toward the ultimate development of an IFRS. 
 
The current priority for this part of the project is the challenges associated with 
recognition and measurement of the “fair” value of insurance contracts so that 
they can be considered as assets to the policyholder and liabilities to the 
insurance company. 
 
The proposals under consideration are based on an asset and liability approach 
rather than a deferral and matching approach – in effect meaning that there will 
be a significant change for those jurisdictions currently based in a deferral and 
matching environment. 
 
Once in place, fair value will require discounted measures rather than 
undiscounted measures, and approach the valuation of liabilities using a 
stochastic paradigm that is prospective in nature. The liability valuation may 
include a “market value margin” representing the premium reflecting the risk 
associated with the overall fair value. Importantly, “fair values” can be expected 
to be lower than the “conservative” values in place in many jurisdictions, implying 
a need to enhance the solvency margin requirement in order to maintain an 
equivalent level of prudence. 
 
Although there is a good deal of work still to be done in this project, the necessity 
for complex technical capacity to facilitate implementation is clear. 
 
It is envisaged that an exposure draft will be issued late in 2004. 
 
3.2.3  Amendments to IAS 32 Financial Instruments: Disclosure and 
Presentation and IAS 39 Financial Instruments: Recognition and 
Measurement 
As indicated above, the treatment of financial instruments for accounting 
purposes takes on a greater importance for insurance companies when it is 
realized that some of their insurance contracts will be accounted for, under the 
IASB regime, as financial instruments where they do not meet the definition of 
insurance contract established by the IASB. 
 
Amendments to these two standards have been under development for some 
time and the process is now at the stage where comments on the Exposure Draft 
issued in June 2002 are being considered. 
 
Additional guidance is proposed on issues such as valuation methodologies, the 
reinforcement of the fair value approach, and the recognition of impairment to 
assets.   23
3.2.4  Implementing International Accounting Standards in Developing 
Economies 
Separately, in June 2002, the IASB initiated an “active research” project to 
consider the application of financial reporting standards for both small and 
medium-sized enterprises and in emerging and transition economies. At this 
stage, the IASB has determined that this project will have, as its priority, the 
issues related to SMEs rather than to emerging economies. 
 
This is not to say that no effort is being made to progress the issues related to 
emerging economies. An advisory panel continues to identify issues of particular 
interest and relevance to emerging economies. 
 
It can be expected that the IASB will seek to make some progress on the 
component of this research project that relates to emerging economies in due 
course. 
3.3 IAA  Developments 
The IAA has created an “Insurer Solvency Assessment Working Party” formed in 
March 2002 whose objective is to support the IAIS in its development of an 
international capital standard for insurers
15. The working party is seeking to carry 
out two particular tasks: 
 
•  First, to describe the principles and methods that would be available for 
the quantification of the total funds needed to provide a chosen level of 
confidence that the insurer’s policyholder obligations will be met
16 
 
•  Second, arising from the earlier work, to identify or elaborate on a 
framework that would apply as a solvency regime (described sometimes 
as the formula without numbers) including giving regard to the practicality 
of approach and the potential as a basis for a “global risk-based solvency 
capital system”. 
 
Ultimately, this work will propose a “consistent framework for capital 
requirements for insurance companies that … can be applied in almost all 
                                                 
15 This working party is chaired by Mr Stuart Wason of Canada and has 20 members (5 from the USA, 3 
from each of Canada and the Netherlands, 2 each from Australia and Belgium, and one from each of 
France, India, Japan, Switzerland, and the UK). Two of the 20 members currently work for supervisory 
authorities. 
16 The Working Party (draft paragraph 3.7.) recognizes that, in some jurisdictions, there is also an element 
of protection provided to other creditors but that practices vary. It implicitly notes that the purpose of 
capital should be to protect policyholders and not to protect owners. Although theoretically uncontroversial, 
this is an important element when the more technical implications of their report are considered. It is also 
important as a precondition because there would be cases where the protection of the interests of 
policyholders can be subordinated to other interests in the country in practice even if not at law.   24
jurisdictions world-wide to suit the circumstances of each jurisdiction” (Working 
Party Draft paragraph 3.1.). 
 
This working party follows on from an earlier working party on solvency that 
delivered a report in early 2002. The earlier working party report outlined key 
elements including the classification of risks using its own taxonomy of risk, an 
overview of the risk assessment process, discussion of modeling tools and 
methods, key components of risk, time horizons, risk management, the 
combination of risk, the application of distributions, assessment of risk, and 
measures of risk, and the implications of these issues for solvency assessment. 
Although it is a reasonably substantive report, it is largely qualitative and 
conceptual. 
 




A review of the draft report of the working party as well as discussions with 
members indicates that a number of guiding principles have been determined, 
although these have not as yet passed through the full IAA approval process. 
The elaboration of these principles, and the points raised relevant to this paper, 
are as follows: 
 
1.  The approach adopted is applied to both insurance and reinsurance 
companies – consistent with the direction of  IAIS initiatives direction 
toward the supervision of reinsurance companies
18 
 
2.  There should be a “three-pillar approach to supervision”. (The three-pillar 
concept is discussed further in 4.1 below). 
 
In particular, the working party has attempted to find ways to measure 
risks and therefore to apply a factor or margin to each risk measure that 
would lead to an element of the capital requirement with respect to these 
risks. To this end, the working approach leads to an emphasis on the first 
pillar unless the risk cannot be adequately assessed through solely 
quantitative measures, or quantitative approaches for solvency purposes 
requires independent review by the supervisor or a designated qualified 
party
19, or where data is not available or models not sufficiently developed 
in which case it would fall to the second pillar. In addition, supervisory 
review is seen as important to encourage improved risk management and 
                                                 
17 The IAA procedures mean that this report will continue to be a draft although the working party will 
have completed their work. Consideration of the parent committee of the working party (the Insurance 
Regulation Committee) and then the council and members who ultimately vote to accept the paper would 
take around 1 year. 
18 Refer paragraph 1.2 of the working party draft report. 
19 With respect to this issue of external review, the working party singles out the assessment and 
verification of internal models as one aspect of this work, and the external review of work by an 
independent actuary as another.   25
measurement practices within firms and to enable intervention if capital is 
insufficient. 
 
3.  All significant types of risk should be included in the structure. The working 
party is of the view that underwriting risk, credit risk, and market risks 
should all be considered as part of pillar 1. Liquidity risk is considered to 
be a matter for pillar II at this stage. 
 
4.  The approach should be principles rather than rules based. In particular, 
they advocate sound principles in the solvency assessment supported by 
specific rules for the purpose of implementation. The working party also 
considers that rules should be able to be varied to reflect current or 
unforeseen circumstances with the agreement of the relevant supervisor. 
(Working Party Draft paragraph 2.12) 
 
Given a principles based approach, then the working party considers that 
a jurisdiction with circumstances the same as another jurisdiction would 
get the same capital requirements whereas a jurisdiction with different 




A “rules based system” is criticized as being simple and objective but 
ultimately encourages insurers to “game the system” and “undermine the 
supervisory process”. (Working Party Draft paragraph 5.7) 
 
5.  In advocating a “total balance sheet approach”, it is implied that solvency 
assessment should be on an economic basis including the measurement 
of the difference between all of the assets and liabilities of the insurer on a 
“fair value” (best estimate or similar). There should be no “hidden” surplus. 
 
6.  The working party has developed a principle with respect to the measure 
of risk that is appropriate as the basis for a capital requirement and 
discuss the desirable qualities of risk measures, particularly that they be 
coherent
21. The risk measure favored by the working party is the 
Conditional Tail Expectation (CTE) or TailVaR
22 measure.  
 
The solvency assessment method also needs to recognize the impact of 
risk dependencies, concentration and diversification as these have a 
                                                 
20 Conditions would include the environmental, demographic, economic, legal and general business 
circumstances as well as the regulatory philosophy (refer Working Party Draft paragraph 3.1.). 
21 A “coherent” measure is referred to representing the mathematical meaning of the term – that it should be 
scaleable (that twice the risk should lead to twice the capital), have ranking properties (that higher risk has 
higher capital), and allows for diversification (that more diversification reduces the amount of capital 
accordingly). 
22 In some jurisdictions this would also be referred to as “expected shortfall” or “conditional tail 
expectation”. Essentially, it is the average of all cases occurring beyond the failure probability point in the 
distribution – ie “how bad is it on average when it goes bad?”   26
significant impact on the net effect of risks for an insurance company. This 
need influences the desirability of risk measures. Dependencies in the 
tails of the risk distribution are of greatest relevance to solvency 
assessment. The working party is keen on Copulas (borrowed originally 
from Physics) for the description of dependencies. These mathematical 
methods have the benefit of allowing for non linear relationships between 
risk dependencies, that means the risks can be more appropriately 
modeled. The relevance of dependencies between risks in the tails of 
statistical distributions is particularly salient for solvency purposes. 
 
7.  The working party discusses the time horizon for the calculations and 
consider that it “should be appropriate”. It is necessary to assess the 
assets and liabilities of the insurer over the full term of the contracts and 
obligations but the term of the solvency assessment is a different 
consideration. The working party has suggested a one year time horizon 
for the assessment of the current financial position and, for the future 
financial position, a period of two years for non-life insurers and five years 
for life insurers
23. As a result, they have implied a two-tier perspective 
similar to that proposed by the EU Solvency II project. 
 
The relevance of the time for reporting and for corrective action is also 
noted in the selection of the time horizon (Working Party Draft paragraph 
3.20 and 3.21). The effect of this analysis is that a jurisdiction with slower 
reporting to supervisors, a longer period of time required to analyze 
supervisory returns or a longer period required before regulatory action 
could be taken would require a longer time horizon (beyond the one year 
proposed) and therefore a higher capital requirement. 
 
Working Party Draft paragraph 2.17 goes further to suggest that 
probabilities are attached to the time horizon’s for the purpose of 
establishing the overall capital requirements, one short term (99% CTE on 
a 1 year horizon) and one long term (90% or 95% CTE on all future 
durations) so as to pick up both systemic and non-systemic risks. The 
capital requirement would then be the greater of these two measures. 
 
This proposal is a significant contribution to the debate as no other project 
has proposed levels of certainty. The working party proposals are no more 
than propositions but their existence in the paper represents a step 
forward in the international debate on this matter. 
 
8.  Risk management is considered to be an important part of the system. In 
fact, the working party advocates that the system should recognize the 
risk management practices of the company to the extent that those 
companies with more advanced risk management procedures should have 
                                                 
23 Note that this is a little different to the 3 year minimum currently in place for the IAIS licensing standard.   27
these internal models approved as the basis for capital calculations. In 
addition, effective risk management is enhanced by disclosure. 
 
9.  While considering that the ultimate system should be based on the models 
of the risks particular to individual insurers and a consistent overall level of 
security and time horizon, it is recognized that some standard approaches 
are necessary. In developing a standard approach, the working party is 
advocating a data based method that would start with a good deal of 
prescription of parameters by the supervisory authority after due analysis 
of data. These parameters would, ideally, be required for each type of risk 
and each line of business and also the dependencies between risks and 
lines of business. It would be expected that the parameters could be set 
taking greater account of the individual company situation, over time or on 
a company by company basis after assessment of their internal risk 
management and measurement systems. 
 
10. In advocating that “advanced” or “company specific” models be 
considered as they can better capture and describe risk in specific 
situations and reflect the peculiarities of a particular portfolio, it is 
recognized that a system of approval of such models should be in place 
where the supervisor investigates and authorizes the use of the model for 
the purpose. Such a system is likely to encourage the development of risk 
management and modeling methods within companies – both for larger 
companies who wish to invest in the development of such models and for 
the jurisdiction as a whole as the best practices of firms gradually progress 
through the sector. 
3.4  Developments at the IAIS 
The IAIS is a relatively new standard setting body. To date, it has established 
and twice revised a set of core principles for insurance supervision and is 
elaborating principles, standards and guidance papers on more detailed topics. 
The organization adopts papers and standards by determination at the annual 
general meeting each year whereby all members vote. There are over 100 
member jurisdictions in the IAIS so the principles and standards can be 
considered to represent a broad consensus view. 
 
In practice, however, the more significant insurance markets play a leading role 
in the development of principles and standards. The first reason for this is the 
substantial resources required to attend meetings and follow the work of the 
numerous committees and sub-committees of the IAIS. The second is that many 
of the emerging country supervisors are looking to the IAIS standards to inform 
improvements they wish to make in their own jurisdictions – ie the output is seen 
as more relevant for them than the input. 
 
A high-priority issue for the IAIS is the development of an internationally 
applicable solvency regime. This work falls largely to the Solvency   28
Subcommittee. Although this subcommittee was originally comprised of members 
from continental Europe and the USA, membership has expanded as the work 
has developed further momentum. 
 
The IAIS Solvency Subcommittee is charged with a mandate to work toward a 
solvency standard. To date, this work has progressed first through the 
development of an issues paper that was released in 2000. Following on from the 
issues paper, a set of Principles on Capital Adequacy and Solvency was 
developed and approved in 2002. These principles set out a roadmap for future 
work as well as represent the achievement of some consensus. Although on first 
reading the principles and accompanying text appear benign enough, there is in 
fact a quantity of detail that may be read as quite instructive as to a solvency 
system. 
 
Subsequent efforts have led to the development of papers on: 
 
•  Quantifying and Assessing Insurance Liabilities: initiated by the IAIS 
Technical Committee in December 1999. This paper largely discusses the 
current state of affairs with respect to this issue but also sets out some 
practices that would be instructive to companies and supervisors. 
 
•  Solvency Control Levels: considered to have general applicability despite 
the fact that the underlying minimum solvency requirement is not defined. 
 
•  The Use of Actuaries as Part of a Supervisory Model: sets out a set of 
considerations that are relevant when considering whether to adopt an 
official role for actuaries, and then goes on to elaborate the conditions that 
should be addressed if such a model is top be adopted. 
 
Further working papers and guidance are under development. These include 
 
•  Guidance Paper on Stress Testing 
 
•  Standard on the Appropriate Forms of Capital. 
 
The work plan of the Solvency Subcommittee calls for work in 2003-4 that 
elaborates on the form of solvency margin requirements and the levels of 
security for liabilities and solvency margin requirements and in 2004-5 the 
acceptability and valuation of assets and the matching of assets with liabilities. 
As the IAA work is timed so as to take the IAA working party report as important 
input, the proposals and principles of the working party can be considered as 
fundamental to the IAIS work. 
 
Ultimately, the eventual form of a solvency regime is likely to be substantially 
more risk based than the current EU system although it may be more practical   29
than the more complex systems currently in operation in some jurisdictions 
24. 
One opportunity for the IAIS project lies in the potential for multi-tiered systems, 
starting with a broad and pragmatic system and then allowing additional 
complexity from this starting point through such features as the adoption of 
internal models or the introduction of less prescription in the parameters as is 
proposed by the IAA. 
 
The diverse range of practices and systems in countries also suggests that it 
may be easier to utilize the IAA approach to come to a common view as to the 
overall levels of adequacy that should be applied. Such an approach would allow 
jurisdictions to implement systems that were consistent at a high level in their 
form but with different parameters to fit with local circumstances while achieving 
the same overall level of security. In other words, a solvency system that is 
consistent but not uniform. 
 
In fact, in terms of the associated level of security provided by a solvency regime, 
a uniform system would not be consistent from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. There 
would be a need to establish parameters on at least a jurisdiction by jurisdiction 
basis or, as the IAA ultimately proposes, a company by company basis, to deliver 
a consistent result. Even in jurisdictions looking to employ the most complex 
approaches, smaller or less sophisticated companies will not be able to justify an 
individualized approach. The completion of an exercise at an industry level will 
be needed to establish a standard set of parameters and approaches and this 
will probably require the leadership of the supervisory authority to complete the 
task and a level of specialist expertise in the development of parameters. 
 
A second committee of relevance is the Reinsurance Subcommittee. This 
Subcommittee has pressed toward a regime of supervision of the reinsurance 
cessions of direct insurance companies and the supervision of reinsurance 
companies. This work is relevant in the context of liberalizing reinsurance 
markets under WTO agreements (see below). 
 
The supervision of reinsurance cessions is an important part of the solvency 
regime. The supervision of the solvency or reinsurance companies is also 
particularly important when there is greater market access from local or 
international reinsurance companies. It is, however, for a country where there 
was previously a single state owned monopoly reinsurance company, a new and 
complex issue to be addressed by supervisors who have not had experience with 
these issues in the past. 
3.5  The Influence of WTO Initiatives 
With respect to liberalizing markets, many countries are progressively moving 
away from product by product approval toward a system that places greater 
                                                 
24 The EU Solvency II project is also moving in this direction, a factor which is likely to make the finding 
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reliance on the supervision of solvency and the risk management capacity of 
firms. As a result, with a stronger reliance on solvency regulation as the critical 
supervisory tool it is important that the solvency regime is robust and provides 
the appropriate level of security for policyholders. Often, however, the product 
liberalization takes place without a review and reinforcement of the solvency 
regime. 
 
The opening of the market to new players including banks and foreign insurers 
increases the number of firms and the level of competition. Competition includes 
both competition for customers as well as competition for distributors, technical 
staff and management. Under the pressure of competition, poor practices are 
more likely to occur as some participants cut corners. Increased competition also 
requires an increased focus on profitability and sound management rather than 
simply on sales growth. 
 
Invariably, the infrastructure to provide for proper risk management such as the 
availability of technical data will be limited. For example, product pricing may be 
based on new concepts where past data are not relevant or the most valid data 
set may only exist in the large former monopoly companies and not be available 
to other insurance companies. The risk of mis-pricing in pursuit of competitive 
goals and underestimating provisions is high. 
 
It could be expected that some companies may not succeed in their plans in the 
new market. As a result, new laws and regulations are required to deal with 
market exit and transfer of ownership and supervision of solvency has to replace 
compliance-based supervisory approaches. 
 
In an environment of competition with new companies and new products, new 
customers are more likely to have a less developed understanding of the 
insurance contracts that are being presented to them and market conduct and 
disclosure rules may be limited. 
 
Common elements of WTO accession include the liberalization of the forms of 
product that can be issued, breaking down monopolies in particular product lines, 
the liberalization of the form of insurance market entry, leading to a wider 
diversity of corporate entity forms that require supervision within a market, the 
liberalization of reinsurance arrangements including the abolition of monopolies 
and compulsory cessions and the licensing of new entrants, particularly the large 
international reinsurance firms, the liberalization of asset controls moving away 
from stricter investment rules toward a more prudent expert approach, and finally 
the liberalization of distribution permitting a wider variety of distribution channels 
and, potentially but not always, cross-border provision of insurance. 
 
This liberalization may be phased over a period but usually one that is fairly 
short. 
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The insurance sector usually benefits rapidly from the introduction of new capital, 
innovation and competition. Product development proceeds at a rapid pace, new 
risk management skills are introduced, and cost efficiency in the sector improves. 
 
However, for the supervisor there are critical challenges in such an environment. 
It is important to effectively supervise the existing companies as they cope with 
rapid change that puts pressure on management, staff, systems and procedures. 
Supervisors also have to deal with either inadequate or recently upgraded 
regulations, contribute to the work of improvement in regulations so that they can 
respond to the new sector situation, and improve their supervision to cover new 
entities and business types. 
 
Where the number of applications for new licenses is also unprecedented, then 
this will seriously stretch even the most competent regulators and supervisors. 
 
If we overlay this with the potential for a radically changing solvency and 
accounting framework then it is clear that investment in the  support and 
development of the supervisors in this environment should be a major priority. 
4 Common  Themes 
This section examines the common aspects to the various initiatives. The steps 
that may need attention are then taken up in the following section. 
4.1  The Attraction of Three Pillars 
Each of the developments targeted at the solvency regulation and supervision 
look likely to embrace the three-pillar paradigm that has been established by the 
review work being conducted by the Basel Committee. A consistent application 
would look like the following: 
 
•  Pillar I: Quantitative requirements 
 
Rules with respect to the valuation of assets and liabilities, capital 
requirements, quantitative rules with respect to asset mix and asset and 
liability matching. 
 
•  Pillar II: Regulations on the conduct of insurance companies and 
supervisory review 
 
With respect to company operations and conduct, qualitative rules such as 
those that require certain corporate governance and internal control 
practices within insurance companies are included. 
 
With respect to the actions of the supervisor, going beyond the verification 
of compliance with the regulatory requirements and quantitative rules, 
supervisory review is targeted at an ongoing risk assessment of insurance   32
companies and their continuing viability. In addition to the conventional 
activities of off-site analysis and on-site inspections, this review must also 
be enhanced by requirements for supervisory approval for particular 
transactions, effective licensing, and ultimately effective sanctions and exit 
procedures. 
 
•  Pillar III: Market discipline 
 
The discipline of the market place can be brought to bear on the 
management and operation of companies. This acts as a force to 
encourage the prudent operation of insurance firms. Such discipline can 
be applied through requirements to disclose information to the 
marketplace. In general terms, this market would be both the market to 
customers, distributors and others associated with the purchase of 
products, and the disclosure to investors and potential investors and their 
representatives who provide capital or debt funding to the institution. 
 
4.2  A Statistical Perspective to Valuation and Capital 
Within the first pillar, the valuation of assets and liabilities and the determination 
of capital levels is proposed to be prospective and heavily dependant on 
statistical methods and approaches. 
 
Such approaches move away from broader “rules of thumb” and approximate 
methods. They rely on technical expertise to develop, maintain and interpret the 
results of the models involved in the valuations and data to be retained and 
analyzed to establish and update parameters. 
4.3  Risk Management within Firms 
The accounting and solvency projects both assume that companies are able to 
measure and manage their risks using the kind of sophisticated techniques that 
are under consideration. To some extent at least, it is recognized that such an 
assumption is made with an element of aspiration rather than as the current 
position in all cases. In other commentary, the importance of having the 
necessary information and methods to effectively operate an insurance business 
are highlighted. Without an understanding of the cost of the benefits provided 
and the potential for variability in outcome it is difficult to make sound business 
decisions about the sound price to charge customers. 
 
Some of the commentary on the IASB proposals, particularly those that have 
generated concern, has indicated that improvements can be made in the 
management and measurement of risk within insurance firms.  
 
The use of these methods for the purpose of reporting to supervisors and to the 
public will automatically lead to company senior management and boards   33
wanting to understand the drivers and implications of the results of the 
calculations. The next step for those companies where management and boards 
would like to see the results improved is to give greater prominence to the risk 
management and measurement processes within the organization. 
4.4 Standard  Approaches  and Internal Models 
All jurisdictions will require standard approaches under the proposals that are 
emerging. Some or all jurisdictions will also have companies that seek to utilize 
internal models. 
 
It is intended that companies will see the internal model development as an 
opportunity to gain some capital relief in return for the effort involved in preparing 
such a model. Efficiencies in management will also be available for 
internationally active firms if they can succeed in having their global models 
accepted in a number of jurisdictions. For supervisors, companies are to be 
encouraged to do so as this improves the recognition of risk and the assessment 
of the solvency position of individual firms. But there needs to be a balance 
between the relative freedom of such an approach and the supervisory review 
and approval of such models. 
 
The EU and the IAIS, should the proposals proceed, would need to elaborate 
conditions and procedures for the approval of internal models in a similar way to 
the approval guidance provided by the Basel Committee with respect to the 
approval of market risk models for banks. 
 
For global models, consideration will need to be given to the approach that would 
be needed if the model is operated from the home office of an insurance group 
but is considered for application toward the capital regime in various host 
jurisdictions. 
4.5  An Absence of Margins in Asset and Liability Valuations 
Both the IAA and the IASB discourage values for assets or liabilities that include 
margins of prudence although for different reasons. The IAA wishes to maintain 
the coherency of the proposed risk measures and the economic approach to the 
assessment of solvency and the IASB is seeking transparency and comparability 
– something that insurance accounts have often lacked. Put simply, “Most 
investors and analysts can’t understand insurer’ financial statements” 
(Gutterman, p3). 
 
In many jurisdictions this will be a significant change in three respects: 
 
•  First, the determination of a provision that is conservative is easier than 
the determination of a provision that represents a particular point estimate. 
A conservative estimate may be more or less conservative and still be   34
conservative whereas a fair value that is overestimated or underestimated 
is no longer the “fair value”. 
 
•  Second, the first time that these values are introduced there could be a 
very substantial one-off effect that will be difficult to interpret and also, 
because of the absence of a past history, difficult for observers to validate 
and understand. 
 
•  Third, without the margins in asset or liability values, the solvency margin 
requirement will be less conservative than it would have otherwise been 
and will need to be adjusted if the force and intent of the statutory 
requirements is to be preserved. 
4.6  Consideration of the Enterprise as a Whole 
Where the current regime does not provide the supervisor with oversight of 
assets other than those that back the technical provisions, then the proposals of 
the EU and the IAA would represent a change in the regulatory approach. 
4.7  The Supervision and Regulation of Reinsurance Companies 
The several moves toward the supervision of reinsurance companies are 
supported or implied by the various initiatives of the IAIS and IAA. Liberalization 
of reinsurance markets in developing countries is also progressing such that this 
matter is taking on greater importance. 
4.8 International  Cooperation 
In the context of new entrants from other jurisdictions, the home supervisor can 
be a source of assistance to the host supervisory authority provided that 
communication and information exchange arrangements can be put in place. 
 
International cooperation, particularly on the reinsurance front, is also important. 
 
Finally, the approval of internal models that operate under management 
structures that are international will provide the opportunity for collaboration 
between home and host supervisors. 
 
5  A Multi-Pillar Response 
The previous sections of this note have set out environmental and institutional 
changes. These changes influence the supervision of solvency in all countries 
through the application of international standards and the increasing presence of 
internationally operating firms. These two factors alone are sufficient to require 
attention to the future for insurance solvency and related supervision. 
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For developed insurance sectors, the proposals have led to concerns being 
expressed about the administrative and technical requirements, the so far limited 
opportunity to fully understanding the implications of the changes, and the 
relatively short timetable particularly with respect to the IASB Phase I project. For 
emerging and developing insurance sectors the proposals, when considered in 
aggregate, could appear to represent a much larger challenge, compounded by 
the additional burdens that need to be given attention in markets in transition 
rather than in a mature and stable state. 
 
For a jurisdiction with concerns about how it would implement the various 
initiatives under development, this section provides some proposals for 
consideration under a broad framework. The framework can be considered first 
overall then with respect to each of the resulting “pillars”. 
5.1  Pillars of Different Strengths 
Within each jurisdiction, and particularly in emerging and developing countries, 
the strength of each of the proposed pillars will be different. The particular pillars 
are subject to separate commentary below. Here, attention is drawn to the 
generic issue. 
 
Within supervisory circles there is a concept of varying reliance on various pillars. 
In effect, if the third pillar is weaker then this should be balanced with a greater 
weight on the second or first pillar within a well balanced supervisory system. 
The IAA working party has gone further to suggest that, where possible, risk 
should be addressed in pillar I, but where this is not possible then recourse is 
needed to pillar II, although this would be the most far reaching of the various 
proposals. For emerging and developing jurisdictions it can be expected that 
there may be weaknesses in each area. 
 
For the authorities, however, it is not possible to rectify all pillars at the one time. 
Priorities have to be established. Some elements cannot be mandated to operate 
effectively through regulation alone and need to be encouraged to develop 
effectively over time. The two areas where the authorities will have control is a 
standardized solvency regime under pillar I and an effective supervisory 
oversight under pillar II. 
 
 
Such a “balance for relative strength” approach would seem to have particular 
merit for developing countries. It would, however, highlight the importance of 
strong capacity within the supervisory authority – something not always present. 
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5.2 National  Discretion 
The approaches proposed in the various projects have yet to detail 
implementation issues closely. The Basel Committee, in contrast, has made it 
clear that there are a number of elements of the banking three-pillar approach 
that are subject to national discretion. 
 
 
A “national discretion” element may prove to be a useful tool for the insurance 
sector as it develops the various proposals. In this way, countries can provide an 
incentive to companies to progress their development of the necessary risk 




A system that requires preconditions to be in place, infrastructure to be 
developed and justification to be made to enable the national authorities to 
provide acceptance can act as an incentive for change. Once the preconditions 
are identified and elaborated, then the industry leaders will have an incentive to 
develop the necessary infrastructure, improve the technical capacities, and to do 
so collaboratively if necessary. 
5.3  Strengthening the First Pillar 
For many countries, the fundamental insurance solvency regimes will require 
change as a result of the proposed accounting standards. 
 
First, and most obvious, will be the reclassification of some premiums to deposit 
type treatments. Where the insurance solvency margin requirement is 
constructed to include a factor based multiple of premiums then this may 
undermine the solvency intention. 
 
The move to market-based “fair values” for assets may require some additional 
supervisory oversight at first in jurisdictions where asset values are not as robust 
due to limited markets, low turnover, or limited experience in the valuation of non 
marketable assets. 
 
The IASB initiatives will require increased technical capacity and increased 
access to market data in many cases.  Such approaches require the collection 
and examination of basic data about the frequency and severity of claims events. 
The usual experience is that such data will not exist at first or will not be in a form 
suitable for robust analysis. There may be limited expertise to analyze the data 
and to apply it to build and then maintain the necessary financial models. These 
limitations may be expressed both in the number of people and the skills of those 
available. The IASB and IAA proposals will, in particular, encourage or even 
mandate improvements to company risk management systems. 
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The IAA, EU and probably IAIS directions will all require the development of 
parameters for a standard method for the jurisdiction for the solvency margin 
requirement that is both adequate and consistent with these directions. 
 
Insurance regulations, particularly those relating to prudential requirements, can 
take some time to change. An element of the proposed Lamfalussy approach 
might be useful to enable the solvency system to be sufficiently responsive to 
future change and reform. That element involves establishing several tiers of 
regulation and a rule-making body for the elaboration of details. In this way, 
elements of detail and guidance can be developed under the delegated authority 
of the ultimate law. Recognizing that some elements of the EU proposal are 
complicated by the multi-state nature of the EU itself, a simpler form than is 
envisioned there could be instituted readily, providing legislative powers to make 
more detailed standards and rules to some appropriate authority. 
 
The introduction of a basic form of stress testing can also be considered as part 
of this approach. Such a requirement can be implemented relatively easily and 
be instructive for all parties as well as encouraging the development of more 
sophisticated approaches within firms over time. 
 
Supervisors can encourage, sponsor, mandate or conduct data studies to 
overcome proprietary data concerns, reluctance, or disincentives in markets 




For those jurisdictions that apply international accounting standards, regulation of 
solvency needs to be reviewed in the light of the proposed accounting changes. 
Changes to the primary laws to introduce a rule-making power and process 
would be beneficial where this does not currently exist. Rule-making powers 
should cover, at least, the solvency margin requirement itself, and valuation 
procedures and rules for assets and liabilities. Regulation or supervision can also 
encourage the development of risk management and measurement within firms 
and the collection and dissemination of industry data sets. 
 
5.4  Establishing a Strong Second Pillar 
In the environment envisioned by the various projects, there is a need for a 
strong supervisory authority. In the case where other pillars are weaker, it is also 
appropriate that the supervisory capacity combines greater reliance with greater 
emphasis. 
 
As pointed out in the discussion on time horizons by the IAA, weaknesses in 
supervision and regulation mean higher capital is required as a consequence of 
the longer lead times that will exist for intervention. 
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The experience of the FSAP has been that regulation and supervision in the 
insurance sector tend to be underdeveloped in several respects relative to the 
banking sector. In particular, regulation can have significant shortcomings, 
supervisory authorities can lack independence and be poorly resourced, 
transparency can be limited, infrastructure and capacity within the supervisory 
authority often need enhancement, and industry technical capacity can be low. 
 
“Weaknesses in meeting the preconditions necessary for effective 
insurance supervision, divergent accounting, actuarial practices, and the 
absence of internationally acceptable standards relating to capital have 
also raised concerns relating to the adequacy of insurance supervisory 
practices. Transparency practices followed by the insurance supervisors 
need strengthening to conform to the internationally accepted good 
practices.” 
 
(Experience with the Insurance Core Principles Assessments Under the 
Financial Sector Assessment Program Prepared by the Staffs of the 
International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, August 21, 2001) 
 
Particular supervisory skills will be required for the development and 
maintenance of the standard solvency structures and the parameters associated 
with them. 
 
For the assessment of company risk management systems and the evaluation 
and approval of internal models, supervisors will need to have both the technical 
staff and the supporting powers. In many cases in emerging and developing 
countries, supervisory authorities are not able to conduct robust off-site analysis.  
They are hampered by  infrequently submitted data from companies, that is 
largely statistical and historic rather than informative and of sufficient scope to 
enable analysis to be conducted, and by insufficient analytical resources. 
 
In some cases, however, it will be possible to enlist the assistance of other 
specialists outside the supervisory staff. Audit firms and actuaries can be 
engaged in the supervisory process to assist in the development of the relevant 
skills, data and models through the rest of the sector. Special purpose audit 
reports can be requested to address issues and inform management and 
supervisors. Professionals can be engaged to provide advice either on an ad hoc 
basis or through formal advisory committees. 
 
Where reinsurance companies are to be supervised, it is useful to give specific 
attention to them even though the structure and processes may well be generic. 
It is more likely that reinsurance business will exhibit data limitations and 
difficulties with respect to the ability to apply statistical methods to the risks that 
they carry. 
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Where it is proposed to consider internal models, then it may well be desirable, 
or in some cases necessary, for collaboration with other supervisors. As part of 
the FSAP procedures, we see that the level of collaboration between supervisors 
on issues relating to individual firms is less than it is with respect to more general 
issues. The opportunity exists for increased collaboration. For supervisors in 
emerging and developing markets, such collaboration should be seen as an 
opportunity to obtain useful assistance and expertise. 
 
 
Steps to enhance supervisory capacity should be taken in preparation for a 
changing environment. Enhancements should be directed at finding additional 
expert staff, conduct of on-site inspections of company risk management 
practices, and the updating of statistical data collections. 
 
Consideration should be given to making increased use of professionals to assist 
the supervisor. 
 
In some cases, supervisors may also have to develop capacities that address the 
specific nature of reinsurance company supervision. 
 
Collaboration with other supervisors will serve as a useful tool for supervisors in 
emerging and developing markets. 
 
5.5  Building a Third Pillar 
The third pillar will be weak in many jurisdictions. The providers of equity may not 
impose great pressure on the local management of firms simply because the 
companies are not listed or not listed in the jurisdiction. Public reporting may be 
of limited value where they do not permit reasonable comparison of companies.  
 
Where consumers are less sophisticated or familiar with financial services then 
the market for products will also not provide as much of an aid to the supervision 
of companies as it would where consumer familiarity with financial issues is more 
developed. 
 
The opportunity exists for other parties to play a role and encourage the 
development of the insurance sector third pillar. In many countries, audit firms 
may prepare an industry overview report on a regular basis. While the 
effectiveness of this activity depends on sufficient timely information available, 
this can be encouraged by supervisors. In some cases, ratings agencies may 
also be engaged in this task, although the sovereign rating ceiling can be an 
issue meaning that it may not be of commercial interest in some cases. 
 
Supervisors or other authorities can act to enhance consumer education through 
the effective operation of customer complaint schemes, education programs, and   40
disclosure requirements on companies. Industry development institutes have 
also proven effective in this role in some countries and may be considered. 
 
Regardless, the third pillar cannot be mandated into existence in the same way 
that the other two pillars can. It takes time to develop and needs to be 
encouraged instead. As a result, although efforts to encourage market discipline 
should be taken, the importance of supervisory oversight will be greater while the 
market discipline is weaker. 
 
6 Summary  Conclusions 
The insurance sector has faced a particularly difficult financial environment in 
recent times. Even for jurisdictions where the investment climate has not been as 
adverse, the influence of the international pricing cycles and of international firms 
seeking to realign operations means that local markets will see secondary effects 
at the very least. 
 
Important initiatives toward international accounting standards and an 
international structure for solvency regimes are underway that will significantly 
change the way insurance solvency is regulated and supervised. Proposals will 
require significant expertise within the insurance sector and within the 
supervisory authority, and will rely on the collection and analysis of substantial, 
detailed data on insurance risks and assets. 
 
The wholesale adoption of the three-pillar approach makes it clear that the 
solvency margin requirements themselves need to be supported by supervisory 
oversight and market discipline. 
 
It can be expected that emerging and developing markets will not have the full 
strength in each of the three pillars that are envisaged by the various proposals. 
Early steps to enhance the situation can be expected to pay dividends. A basic 
structure would require: 
 
•  Legislation that establishes a rule-making power such that supervisory 
rules can be developed applying to assets, liabilities and the solvency 
margin requirement 
 
•  Rule-making powers to cover internal risk measurement and management 
 
•  Industry or supervisor sponsored collection and publication of data sets to 
assist in the quantification of risk 
 
•  Enhanced supervisory staffing in recognition of the relative weakness of 
other pillars 
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•  Encouragement of technical developments within the sector 
 
•  Consideration of an increased role for professionals to assist with 
supervisory tasks 
 
•  Collaboration with home supervisors of foreign insurers operating in the 
jurisdiction 
 
•  Initiating a program to enhance market discipline through (if necessary) 
revised public disclosures of financial information by firms, revised 
disclosures to customers, and encouragement of industry publications. 
 
Initially, the most significant challenges will rest with the development of a 
standard solvency system that should get early attention. Over time, as technical 
skills increase within the sector and as market discipline grows, then it will be 
possible to progressively move to a greater reliance on the alternative pillars of 
the supervisory structure.  
 
In an environment that is usually marked by a rapid pace of change, the 
challenges are even greater.  
 
Overall, countries should start now in their efforts to make legislation sufficiently 
flexible so that the new accounting standards can be easily adopted as they are 
implemented, gather data for analysis - particularly for parameterization of 
standard formulae for the solvency margin requirement - and develop technical 
capacities within the supervisory authority. 
 
At the same time, although recognizing that it will take longer, countries should 
encourage marketplace development of technical capacity and strengthen 
market discipline. Even in industrial countries, this can represent a challenge. 
 
Supervisory oversight needs to encourage as well as compensate for 
weaknesses in the other pillars of the structure - technical capacity within the 
sector may be limited and market discipline is less likely to be fully developed. 
Strengthening of supervisory oversight is needed to compensate until other 
capacities can be grown in the sector. 
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